China and Russia Hold Critical Leverage in US-Iran War of Attrition

The protracted confrontation between the United States and Iran has entered a phase where neither side appears willing to blink, but two outside powers are increasingly shaping the odds. As diplomatic talks hit a fresh impasse over Israel’s continued strikes in Lebanon, China and Russia are positioned to influence how long Tehran can hold out under the weight of U.S. economic and military pressure.

For years, Iran has invested heavily in deepening cooperation with Beijing and Moscow. Though neither relationship constitutes a formal military alliance, both have provided critical lifelines across economic, diplomatic, and defense fronts—often in defiance of Washington’s campaign to isolate the Islamic Republic. Now, with the White House facing its own domestic headwinds, rising energy costs linked to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, and questions about the sustainability of munitions stockpiles, the endurance game is growing more complex.

“In Iran, a growing perception has emerged that Trump is primarily seeking to buy time,” said Mehdi Kharratiyan, head of the Institute for Revival of Politics think tank in Tehran. “In response to such a strategy, Tehran would logically pursue an unprecedented strengthening of its relations with Beijing and Moscow to address economic challenges and, if necessary, prepare for a return to military confrontation.”

Iran’s military doctrine, built on a decentralized “mosaic” approach, has enabled the country and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to survive decapitation strikes while still projecting power through missile and drone attacks on U.S. bases, Israel, Gulf Arab states, and regional shipping. Even President Donald Trump has acknowledged that Iranian retaliation exceeded expectations—a factor that likely contributed to his call for a ceasefire in early April, though clashes have since escalated. A U.S. naval counter-blockade on Iranian ports has further tightened the economic screws.

“The United States appears to assess that due to maritime pressure and mounting economic challenges, Iran would capitulate before the United States in a prolonged confrontation,” Kharratiyan said. “At the same time, President Trump has little interest in allowing a new war to spiral beyond control and leave him in a politically unfavorable position on the eve of the World Cup and crucial midterm elections. He is also operating under pressure from the Israeli lobby.”

“His most advantageous strategy is to keep Iran engaged through negotiations within parameters favorable to Washington while signaling to financial markets that the war is likely to end soon,” he added. “In practice, however, by prolonging the negotiations and maintaining a state of ‘neither war nor peace,’ the United States can deprive Tehran of both time and strategic initiative, ultimately increasing the likelihood that Iran will accept Trump’s terms.”

Yet Iran’s insistence on key demands—especially a halt to hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon—continues to frustrate U.S. negotiators. Tehran suspended talks after Israel intensified operations against Hezbollah, an Iranian ally. “Iran views the issue of Lebanon—and preventing a transformation of the Shiite geopolitical position in the Middle East—as an existential and prestige-related matter,” Kharratiyan noted. “It is difficult to envision a scenario in which Iran and the United States reach a ceasefire while the Lebanon issue remains unresolved.”

Both Washington and Tehran are making costly bets, but China and Russia seem prepared to raise the stakes for the White House—even if neither wants direct military involvement. Former State Department official Jon Alterman, now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Newsweek, “China and Russia have helped Iran since the war broke out, but that help has supported Iranian policy rather than shaping it. They each have an interest in the United States being distracted by threats other than themselves, and they have an interest in challenges to U.S. dominance.”

The extent of material support from Beijing and Moscow remains debated. The three nations held joint naval exercises in South Africa and the Persian Gulf early this year, but tangible military aid has been limited. Iran has yet to receive advanced Russian Su-35 jets it ordered years ago, though it has acquired Yak-130 fighters and Mi-28 helicopters. A comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in January 2024 did not include a mutual defense clause, unlike Russia’s pact with North Korea.

China’s 2021 strategic partnership with Iran focused on large-scale investment in infrastructure and oil purchases. Nearly all of Iran’s oil now goes to China, and Chinese buyers have built what researchers call one of the world’s largest sanctions-evasion networks. Reports also indicate that Iran has benefited from Chinese and Russian intelligence sharing, including satellite imagery that may have enhanced precision strikes on U.S. sites and regional energy facilities.

Christopher Walker, vice president at the Center for European Policy Analysis, added, “China has purchased large volumes of sanctioned Iranian oil, and Chinese buyers have worked closely with Iran to build one of the world’s largest sanctions-evasion networks. Russia has reportedly been supplying Iran with intelligence on the locations of American troops, ships, and aircraft, and has continued delivering weapons components and technical expertise since the U.S. and Israeli strikes began.”

Ideological alignment also plays a role. Iran has formalized its tilt toward the East by joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2023 and the BRICS group in 2024. These platforms, along with a shared media and propaganda infrastructure, allow the three countries to systematically challenge U.S. influence. “It will take a concerted and sustained approach from the U.S. and its allies to contest this already mature and resilient authoritarian support network,” Walker said.

However, analysts caution that Iran’s relationships with China and Russia remain transactional. Alterman noted, “China and Russia are more important to Iran than vice versa. China is Iran’s largest oil customer and represents more than one-third of Iran’s trade, while Iran accounts for less than 1 percent of China’s trade. Each sees Iran as an opportunity to weaken the United States, but neither really ‘needs’ Iran.”

Both powers must also balance their ties with Iran against relationships with wealthy Gulf Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are major oil suppliers and business hubs. “Saudi Arabia exports more oil to China than Iran does, and the UAE is an important base for many wealthy Russians,” Alterman said. “The important thing is that China and Russia don’t really believe in allies. They are transactional. It was only business.”

Iran’s own historical skepticism of foreign alliances also imposes limits. The Islamic Republic fought its last major war largely alone in the 1980s, a memory that fuels its emphasis on self-reliance. Arash Reisinezhad, visiting assistant professor at Tufts University’s Fletcher School, explained, “During the recent wars, both countries offered political support and diplomatic backing, but neither provided the kind of decisive and unconditional support associated with military alliances. A widespread perception exists among Iranian policymakers that in moments of existential crisis, neither Moscow nor Beijing can ultimately be relied upon as guarantors of Iranian security.”

Yet the debate inside Iran is evolving. A growing number of voices call for closer security coordination with China, even if formal alliances are unlikely. Reisinezhad pointed to a different form of cooperation: “Where China and Russia may become more important is not through alliance formation but through accelerating Eurasian connectivity. Future cooperation is likely to focus on trade routes, logistics networks, and continental corridors linking East Asia, Central Asia, Russia, and the Middle East.”

This approach serves core Chinese and Russian interests. Iran is uniquely positioned as the only country that can give China direct overland access to the Persian Gulf, acting as an east-west bridge linking Central Asia to West Asia. For Russia, Iran forms a crucial component of the southern Eurasian rimland. “A severe weakening or collapse of the Islamic Republic could generate greater strategic pressure along Russia’s southern flank while simultaneously increasing pressure on China’s western periphery,” Reisinezhad said. “This does not mean that either power will fight on Iran’s behalf, but it helps explain why both Moscow and Beijing have strong incentives to preserve stability in Iran and maintain cooperative relations with Tehran.”

In the end, the US-Iran endurance match may not be decided solely by military force or economic sanctions, but by the silent calculations of two rival powers whose interests align just enough to keep Iran in the game.

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