Iran's Asymmetric Blueprint: How Tehran Plans to Counter U.S. Military Dominance
As diplomatic efforts falter, a chillingly detailed operational plan published by Tasnim News Agency, affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has laid bare Tehran's vision for a potential war with the United States. The doctrine, which emerged just as both sides agreed to new talks in Oman, hinges not on matching American firepower but on exploiting asymmetric advantages to inflict unsustainable costs.
The envisioned conflict would begin with anticipated U.S. air and missile strikes on Iranian nuclear and military sites. In response, Iran's strategy calls for an immediate and overwhelming retaliation aimed at U.S. assets across the Middle East. Primary targets would include critical hubs like the Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar and Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, using barrages of ballistic missiles and drones designed to saturate advanced missile defence systems like Patriot and THAAD.
Central to Iran's calculus is the activation of its "axis of resistance." The plan assumes Hezbollah would open a sustained front against Israel, while Houthi rebels in Yemen would intensify attacks on Red Sea shipping and regional bases. Iraqi militias aligned with Tehran would target remaining U.S. personnel. This multi-proxy approach aims to stretch U.S. and allied forces thin across disparate theatres, preventing a concentrated assault on Iran itself.
Parallel to kinetic attacks, Iranian cyber units would target perceived American vulnerabilities in civilian infrastructure—transportation, energy grids, and financial systems—in an attempt to disrupt military logistics and pressure host nations to expel U.S. forces. However, analysts note that U.S. Cyber Command's capabilities significantly outmatch Iran's, posing a major risk to Tehran's own, more vulnerable networks.
Iran's most potent economic weapon remains its geographic control over the Strait of Hormuz. The plan explicitly threatens to close this critical chokepoint—through which 21% of global oil passes—using mines, anti-ship missiles, and swarming tactics by IRGC fast-attack craft. Such a move would trigger a global oil price shock, potentially fracturing the international coalition against Iran. Yet, this is a double-edged sword; oil exports fund the Iranian state, and a blockade would devastate its own economy.
Ultimately, the doctrine reflects a strategy of asymmetric endurance. Iranian planners, citing America's war-weariness after Afghanistan and Iraq, bank on Washington deeming the costs of a protracted, multi-front conflict—in casualties, economic disruption, and political capital—too high to bear. The unspoken hope, however, is that the very publication of this plan serves as a deterrent, making its horrific scenarios never need to be tested.
Reactions & Analysis
General (Ret.) Marcus Thorne, former CENTCOM strategist: "This is a classic asymmetric playbook, but it overestimates the cohesion of proxy forces and underestimates U.S. and allied resolve to keep sea lanes open. The cyber and missile threats are real, but our layered defences and counter-force capabilities have evolved significantly since 2020."
Dr. Leila Shirazi, regional analyst at the Gulf States Institute: "The document is as much a political tool as a military one. It signals readiness to domestic hardliners and attempts to shape adversary calculus by projecting a capability for widespread chaos. The economic interdependence, however, makes a full Hormuz closure a suicidal last resort."
Mark Kovac, security consultant and veteran: "This is a reckless fantasy that plays with global economic fire. It assumes the U.S. will fight with one hand tied behind its back. If enacted, it would guarantee a devastating conventional response against IRGC infrastructure and leadership targets. Tehran's regime is gambling with the lives of its people for a bluff."
Sarah Chen, energy markets analyst: "The immediate market panic from even a threat to Hormuz would be severe. However, strategic reserves and alternative shipping routes, albeit longer and costlier, would eventually mitigate the impact. The real vulnerability lies in the sustained instability across multiple producer nations simultaneously."