Pearl Harbor, 9/11 and Oct. 7: The Intelligence Failure That Keeps Repeating

TEL AVIV — With Israel’s first national election since the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack now only three weeks away, the country remains divided over whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu received warnings from regional allies that a large-scale assault was coming—even if those warnings lacked precise timing or location.
Netanyahu has denied receiving any such warnings. But the increasingly bitter debate over what he knew, and when, risks obscuring a broader and well-documented problem: In intelligence, an abundance of signals can be misread, dismissed or underestimated until catastrophe strikes—often at a cost of thousands of lives. Analysts call it strategic intelligence failure. It is a phenomenon that has scarred the United States at Pearl Harbor and on Sept. 11, 2001.
According to Israeli officials, Israel possessed Hamas’s own secret plan for the attack a year before it happened. In the months and weeks before the assault, Hamas discussed its intentions in public statements and circulated videos of fighters rehearsing. In the hours before the attack, Israeli intelligence agencies watched some Hamas leaders go underground and commandos gather at multiple locations. Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic intelligence service, was alerted that Israeli SIM cards distributed to Hamas fighters had been activated—a signal of an imminent intention to cross into Israel. A female Israeli soldier stationed at the Gaza border had warned her commander for months about Hamas operatives she believed were preparing an attack.
Yet on the evening of Oct. 6, 2023, Israeli military and intelligence officials appear to have never imagined what would unfold early the next morning, when thousands of Hamas militants stormed across the border in pickup trucks, on motorcycles and even aboard motorized hang gliders, rampaging through communities and military bases.
“There was a lot of information. They just didn’t understand it correctly,” Shlomo Mofaz, a former senior Israeli military intelligence official who now heads the independent Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, told CBS News.
A familiar intelligence failure
Israel was not the first nation to miss warning signs of a looming catastrophe. Before Japan launched its surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and other U.S. naval bases in the region on Dec. 7, 1941, drawing the United States into World War II, there were indications of an impending strike. U.S.-Japanese talks aimed at avoiding a clash had just collapsed. Weeks earlier, the Japanese fleet had vanished into the Pacific. Even when U.S. radar detected more than 180 Japanese aircraft heading toward Hawaii, American officers failed to grasp what they were seeing.
Part of the reason was an overriding belief among top U.S. commanders that Japan was focused on battles closer to its own borders and would not risk war with the United States.
Before the Sept. 11 attacks, U.S. intelligence agencies knew that al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was planning something. They had noticed suspicious individuals from the Middle East learning to fly planes—but not how to land them. Still, they never connected the dots. It was, in the words of the 9/11 Commission, a catastrophic failure “of imagination.” For decades, the United States had concentrated on conventional threats from rivals of similar strength, such as the Soviet Union. Few considered that a small but determined terrorist network like al Qaeda could inflict such devastation, the commission concluded.
In all three cases—Pearl Harbor, 9/11 and Oct. 7—the stronger party failed to recognize that the weaker party was not deterred. It was determined to keep fighting by any means necessary.
Former senior Israeli security officials have said Israel believed it could contain Hamas while devoting most of its resources to clearer and more potent threats, such as Iran and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.
“Even when they understood that Hamas was going to do something, it was never in the dimension and in the force that they eventually did,” Mofaz told CBS News.
The implications extend beyond any single inquiry. For Israel, the Oct. 7 failure has reshaped domestic politics, military doctrine and the public’s faith in the institutions charged with protecting them. For the United States, Pearl Harbor and 9/11 led to sweeping reorganizations of intelligence agencies and new debates over how to balance civil liberties with security. The common lesson is not simply that warnings were ignored. It is that even sophisticated governments can become trapped by assumptions about what an adversary will dare to do—until the unimaginable becomes real.
