‘Salami Slicing’ in the Pacific: How Beijing Is Quietly Expanding Its Maritime Reach
Over the past month, Chinese civilian law‑enforcement vessels have ventured farther from the country’s mainland than at any point in recent memory, conducting seabed mapping and what Beijing calls “research” inside a highly contested lagoon more than 500 miles from its shores. The activities — part of a long‑running strategy critics describe as “salami slicing” — are designed to steadily expand China’s de facto control over waters where its legal claims remain disputed.
Analysts say the latest push is a calculated attempt to project power beyond the so‐called First Island Chain, a strategic arc that Washington and Beijing have long regarded as a critical line of control in the western Pacific. The moves carry particular significance for Taiwan, the self‑governing island that China has vowed to “reunify” with — by force if necessary.
The flurry of maritime activity followed a publicly cordial visit to Beijing by U.S. President Donald Trump, during which Chinese leader Xi Jinping made a point of underscoring that Taiwan remains the single biggest potential flashpoint in U.S.–China relations.
Earlier this month, three vessels from China’s Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) — a civilian law‑enforcement arm — sailed through the Bashi Channel between the Philippines and Taiwan to begin mapping and enforcement operations east of Taiwan. According to observers, it marks the first time MSA ships have been observed operating east of the First Island Chain, which runs from southern Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines, and along the edge of the southern South China Sea to Singapore.
Ray Powell, director of the SeaLight project at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation, described the deployment as a “Bashi Breakout.” Beijing, he said, “is essentially saying we have jurisdiction over this area on the other side of the First Island Chain. That’s pretty significant.” Powell noted that this is the first time Chinese ships have conducted what amounts to a sovereignty patrol outside the controversial nine‑dash line — a claim over much of the South China Sea that the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in 2016 had no legal basis. “They are trying to create new facts on the water,” he said.
China’s state‑run Global Times called the MSA deployment “a sovereignty declaration with both legal significance and political signaling.” Much of that signaling appeared aimed directly at Taiwan and its 23 million people.
Through Yuyuan Tantian — a semi‑official social media account that Beijing sometimes uses to test international reactions — Chinese authorities said the MSA ships had mapped the seabed east of Taiwan for the first time. The account pushed back against foreign assertions that China lacks the ability to assert authority in those waters. “The waters east of Taiwan Island will constitute our ‘nearshore waters’ — the very waters where we maintain a presence and exercise jurisdiction and governance,” the post stated.
Taiwan President Lai Ching‑te said the objective was unmistakable. “Their real objective is to expand,” he said. A Taiwanese security official added that Beijing is using the MSA ships to create a false impression of de facto jurisdiction over Taiwan. Lai argued that China continues to “innovate” ways to advance its territorial claims and threaten Taiwan and other Indo‑Pacific nations. “China’s threats towards Taiwan know no limits,” he told reporters.
China made its first slice of that salami in 2023, expanding the nine‑dash line to 10 dashes, with the 10th running east of Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has conducted exercises in that area before, but analysts believe the MSA and similar non‑military vessels may ultimately pose a greater threat to the status quo because their actions seem less provocative. The MSA performs policing roles, enforcing environmental and maritime regulations. During the recent transit, Taiwan’s coast guard reported that Chinese MSA ships issued radio challenges to commercial vessels heading to Taiwan.
Powell warned of a possible next step — the “tightening of the boa constrictor” — in which Chinese ships could actually stop those vessels or divert them to Chinese ports before they reach Taiwan. Targeting liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, for instance, could send an ominous message to Taipei, which relies on imports for almost all its energy. “Something to let Taiwan know we can starve you out when it comes to LNG,” Powell said, describing a gradual escalation that could ultimately let Beijing control Taiwan’s energy lifeline.
Experts also noted that the “nearshore waters” language floated by Yuyuan Tantian, if formally adopted by a government agency, could allow China to treat those waters as sovereign territory. Carl Schuster, a former director of the U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center, explained that under such a designation, “foreign vessels have no right of entry without permission of the nation with sovereignty over these near‑shore waters.”
Foreign powers with interests in Taiwan are taking notice. A U.S. State Department spokesperson said China’s actions “are deeply destabilizing,” while Britain, France and Germany issued a rare joint statement from their de facto embassies in Taipei expressing “concern” over “novel Chinese activity in the waters east of Taiwan.” The European powers warned that such actions “threaten regional stability and the freedom of navigation and safety of international shipping.”
Schuster also highlighted the military implications of the seabed‑mapping operation, noting that it would improve the PLA Navy’s ability to operate submarines and task groups in the area, while giving Beijing a detailed picture of undersea cables, exploitable resources, and bottom features.
Analysts suggest recent talks between Japan and the Philippines over overlapping exclusive economic zones east of Taiwan may have provided the immediate trigger for the MSA mission. Powell wrote that Beijing sensed an opportunity and moved quickly to call the talks “completely illegal and void.” A Taiwanese security official echoed that view, saying China has exploited multiple strategic windows over the past decade to pursue expansionist military and gray‑zone activities across the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. “It will be a grave misreading if you only look at China’s regional activities through the lenses of China‑Taiwan tensions,” the official added, noting that Japan and the Philippines are also bearing the brunt of Beijing’s ambitions.
Meanwhile, in the South China Sea, attention has focused on Scarborough Shoal, an uninhabited rock with a central lagoon about 140 miles west of the main Philippine island of Luzon. The shoal lies well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone but has been effectively controlled by China since 2012, with a near‑constant coast guard presence. Satellite photos recently showed a small floating structure near the lagoon entrance, raising alarm in Manila. China said it was conducting maritime research before later withdrawing it, but Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro expressed skepticism, pointing to Beijing’s history of using research vessels as a ruse — including the string of islands and atolls in the South China Sea that were converted into military bases despite a 2015 pledge by Xi Jinping not to do so. “If they … lied before, they can lie now,” Teodoro told the Financial Times.
The U.S. Embassy in Manila announced Tuesday that it is providing the Philippines with four sea‑going drones worth $13 million to help “monitor and respond to maritime challenges,” including “gray‑zone activities and threats to freedom of navigation.” Yet Powell noted that past protests from Washington and other capitals failed to slow China’s island‑building campaign. “We can slice a piece off the salami and that sets conditions for the next piece. This is their opportunity to slice off that little piece,” he said of the actions east of Taiwan.
Powell said the possibility of concrete action by the MSA or China Coast Guard to prevent ships from calling at Taiwan, or of constructing new facilities on Scarborough Shoal, is “the thing that would keep me up at night.” His greatest fear, he added, is that the response from others “would be a shrug.” That, he suggested, could mean the last piece of salami has already been sliced — and the advantage lies with China.